Attack on Non-Proliferation
Under its nuclear umbrella, Israel conducts attacks against its neighbors. In doing so, it threatens to kill the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(Photo montage: Fragen zur Zeit; Map: Виктор В, CC BY-SA 4.0 , via Wikimedia Commons; Nuclear Hazard: MaxxL, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons)
Who you consider the "good" or "bad" actor in the Middle East is largely irrelevant for assessing the strategic situation. The reality is this: Israel possesses nuclear weapons and reserves the right to attack its neighboring states, far beyond just Iran. These attacks extend to outright state terrorism, such as the airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1, 2024, the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh during a diplomatic visit in Tehran on July 31, 2024, or the recent strikes on Iranian leadership.
In terms of global politics, this state terrorism is far more dangerous than the genocide in Gaza. One may be morally outraged about the latter, but the harsh reality is that Israel can eradicate the Palestinians without them having any meaningful means to resist. There’s a reason state terrorism is relatively rare, despite the considerable damage it can inflict, as Israel has demonstrated. That reason isn’t moral restraint. It’s the fact that the other side can retaliate, and defending against terrorism executed by professional intelligence services is extraordinarily difficult. Especially when it comes to assassinations of leadership, defense against a modern adversary becomes a nightmare. Just ask those who’ve gone up against the mafia and live under police protection, a life barely less restrictetd than in jail. A state intelligence service has even far greater logistical and technological capabilities. Nowadays, a sniper isn’t even necessary. A drone can be positioned near a target’s home, activated remotely after the assassin is long gone, with the target’s location confirmed electronically or via satellite. To be safe from such threats, one would have to live in a bunker. This is likely why Iranian personnel were unprotected: even generals and nuclear program engineers want to spend time with their families. This is why mutual assassinations are rare, even among bitterly hostile states. They haven’t occurred in the Russia-Ukraine war, for instance. Just because some people asked about the difference between Israeli an Russian actions, as of late.
Israel is the only country in its region with a nuclear deterrent. Its enemies must therefore factor in the possibility that Israel could escalate to nuclear annihilation in response to their actions. Israel wouldn’t do so lightly, but what if it lost a missile and drone exchange? For Iran, the problem is that any retaliation to an Israeli attack carries the risk of total annihilation.
Iran is in a difficult position. Diplomatically, it relies on Russian and Chinese goodwill almost as much as Israel depends on American support. Neither Russia nor China wants to expand the nuclear club. An Iranian nuclear bomb would trigger a nuclear arms race, at least in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, if not across the entire region. Iran’s solution has been to forgo building a nuclear weapon while maintaining the capacity to quickly develop one if necessary. This isn’t unusual.
Building a nuclear warhead is no longer difficult. The technology is 80 years old. Most developed countries could do so relatively quickly, and the NPT guarantees every member state the right to a civilian nuclear program, which can always provide the material for nuclear armament. The real challenge lies in delivery systems. But any well-equipped military today possesses these, at least for medium-range capabilities, due to the increased precision of modern ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles, with their high terminal velocity and altitude, are by far the most reliable delivery system for nuclear warheads and the backbone of any nuclear deterrent. During the Cold War, they were so imprecise that only nuclear warheads made sense as payloads. With a nuclear weapon, missing the target by a few hundred meters is not a big deal. Non-nuclear states therefor often lacked such systems. Germany’s Bundeswehr, for example, still doesn’t have them. But the Ukraine war has shown that modern medium-range ballistic missiles are precise enough for conventional use. A modern army without them has a significant capability gap. In Iran, such missiles have long been a key part of military doctrine and bore the brunt of all strikes against Israel. Even without considering Iran, these technological advancements have made nuclear non-proliferation harder to maintain.
Iran’s status as a near-nuclear power has created a certain balance, as evidenced by the fact that this solution to the Iranian-Israeli conflict has held for two decades. It’s always shaky to retroactively apply theories to past events, but I’d wager that Israel and the U.S. also had strong incentives to exercise restraint toward Iran. A series of conventional attacks failing to destroy Iran’s nuclear program would push Iran to build a bomb, giving it justification before its Russian and Chinese patrons. Israel would then face the choice of launching a nuclear strike, becoming a global pariah, or tolerating a rival with its own nuclear deterrent. From this perspective, the status quo was a tolerable situation for Israel.
Much has changed in both Israel and the U.S. I don’t have to say much about America ant this point, just yesterday, the Democratic House Speaker from Minnesota was assassinated after voting with Republicans against healthcare for illegal immigrants. In Israel, Netanyahu, after multiple government crises, elections, and an ongoing corruption trial, leads a coalition of seven parties, relying on religious extremists and ultra-Zionists to stay in power and out of jail. In his war, he’s not only starving Gaza but has occupied parts of Syria beyond the Golan Heights, up to 20 km from Damascus.
In recent negotiations, American officials have either fully aligned with Netanyahu’s demand for the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program like special envoy Steve Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio or, as shown in documents available to Axios1, at least insisted on severe restrictions. This is unacceptable to Iran and upends the previous balance, especially since the U.S., during Trump’s first term, already tore up its predecessor’s nuclear deal with Iran, shredding its credibility.
This has brought the balance—Israel’s sole nuclear deterrence alongside Iran’s nuclear program—to a knife’s edge. If Iran builds a bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia will follow, collapsing the non-proliferation regime in the Middle East and perhaps beyond. Ironically, Israel, which never signed the NPT, is leveraging the potential collapse of the non-proliferation regime it’s causing. Netanyahu can tell Western leaders that either Iran must be swiftly subdued or the non-proliferation regime is at risk. European countries could conceivably withdraw conventional support from Israel, but they are secondary at best. In the U.S., Trump needs at least 50 Republican senators to pass his reconciliation bill and keep the government afloat. With 53 Republicans in the Senate, the Israel lobby has more than enough power to derail his presidency. No U.S. president could withdraw support from Israel.
As long as Israel is supported with the conventional capacity to attack Iran, it can continue its current policy, where an Iran without a nuclear deterrent faces the prospect of nuclear annihilation in every escalation. One needn’t sympathize with the Islamic Republic to see that this is not a stable situation.
Ravid, Barak (2025): Scoop: U.S. nuclear deal offer allows Iran to enrich uranium, in: Axios 02. 06. 2025 https://www.axios.com/2025/06/02/iran-nuclear-deal-proposal-enrich-uranium.